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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c575
1 files changed, 563 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
index b39f10b..58e400d 100644
--- a/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
+++ b/crypto/pkcs8/pkcs8.c
@@ -55,19 +55,26 @@
#include <openssl/pkcs8.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/buf.h>
#include <openssl/cipher.h>
#include <openssl/digest.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include "../bytestring/internal.h"
#include "../evp/internal.h"
#define PKCS12_KEY_ID 1
#define PKCS12_IV_ID 2
+#define PKCS12_MAC_ID 3
static int ascii_to_ucs2(const char *ascii, size_t ascii_len,
uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len) {
@@ -96,7 +103,7 @@ static int ascii_to_ucs2(const char *ascii, size_t ascii_len,
}
static int pkcs12_key_gen_raw(const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
- uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
+ const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
int id, int iterations,
size_t out_len, uint8_t *out,
const EVP_MD *md_type) {
@@ -256,17 +263,20 @@ typedef int (*keygen_func)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *pass_raw,
struct pbe_suite {
int pbe_nid;
- int cipher_nid;
- int md_nid;
+ const EVP_CIPHER* (*cipher_func)();
+ const EVP_MD* (*md_func)();
keygen_func keygen;
};
static const struct pbe_suite kBuiltinPBE[] = {
{
- NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, NID_rc4, NID_sha1, pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen,
+ NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, EVP_rc2_40_cbc, EVP_sha1, pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen,
+ },
+ {
+ NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, EVP_rc4, EVP_sha1, pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen,
},
{
- NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, NID_des_ede3_cbc, NID_sha1,
+ NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc, EVP_sha1,
pkcs12_pbe_keyivgen,
},
};
@@ -283,8 +293,8 @@ static int pbe_cipher_init(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj,
const int pbe_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbe_obj);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(kBuiltinPBE) / sizeof(struct pbe_suite); i++) {
- suite = &kBuiltinPBE[i];
- if (suite->pbe_nid == pbe_nid) {
+ if (kBuiltinPBE[i].pbe_nid == pbe_nid) {
+ suite = &kBuiltinPBE[i];
break;
}
}
@@ -301,20 +311,20 @@ static int pbe_cipher_init(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj,
return 0;
}
- if (suite->cipher_nid == -1) {
+ if (suite->cipher_func == NULL) {
cipher = NULL;
} else {
- cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(suite->cipher_nid);
+ cipher = suite->cipher_func();
if (!cipher) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, pbe_cipher_init, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER);
return 0;
}
}
- if (suite->md_nid == -1) {
+ if (suite->md_func == NULL) {
md = NULL;
} else {
- md = EVP_get_digestbynid(suite->md_nid);
+ md = suite->md_func();
if (!md) {
OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, pbe_cipher_init, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST);
return 0;
@@ -332,7 +342,8 @@ static int pbe_cipher_init(ASN1_OBJECT *pbe_obj,
static int pbe_crypt(const X509_ALGOR *algor,
const uint8_t *pass_raw, size_t pass_raw_len,
- uint8_t *in, size_t in_len, uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
+ const uint8_t *in, size_t in_len,
+ uint8_t **out, size_t *out_len,
int is_encrypt) {
uint8_t *buf;
int n, ret = 0;
@@ -601,3 +612,543 @@ error:
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
return NULL;
}
+
+struct pkcs12_context {
+ EVP_PKEY **out_key;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs;
+ uint8_t *password;
+ size_t password_len;
+};
+
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info, unsigned depth,
+ struct pkcs12_context *ctx);
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_content_infos parses a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos in a
+ * SEQUENCE. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_infos(CBS *content_infos,
+ unsigned depth,
+ struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+ uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+ size_t der_len;
+ CBS in;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Generally we only expect depths 0 (the top level, with a
+ * pkcs7-encryptedData and a pkcs7-data) and depth 1 (the various PKCS#12
+ * bags). */
+ if (depth > 3) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_infos,
+ PKCS8_R_PKCS12_TOO_DEEPLY_NESTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Although a BER->DER conversion is done at the beginning of |PKCS12_parse|,
+ * the ASN.1 data gets wrapped in OCTETSTRINGs and/or encrypted and the
+ * conversion cannot see through those wrappings. So each time we step
+ * through one we need to convert to DER again. */
+ if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(content_infos, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+ CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+ } else {
+ CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(content_infos), CBS_len(content_infos));
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &in, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_infos,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ while (CBS_len(&in) > 0) {
+ CBS content_info;
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &content_info, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_infos,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!PKCS12_handle_content_info(&content_info, depth + 1, ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* NSS includes additional data after the SEQUENCE, but it's an (unwrapped)
+ * copy of the same encrypted private key (with the same IV and
+ * ciphertext)! */
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* PKCS12_handle_content_info parses a single PKCS#7 ContentInfo element in a
+ * PKCS#12 structure. */
+static int PKCS12_handle_content_info(CBS *content_info, unsigned depth,
+ struct pkcs12_context *ctx) {
+ CBS content_type, wrapped_contents, contents, content_infos;
+ int nid, ret = 0;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(content_info, &wrapped_contents,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ nid = OBJ_cbs2nid(&content_type);
+ if (nid == NID_pkcs7_encrypted) {
+ /* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-13.
+ *
+ * PKCS#7 encrypted data inside a PKCS#12 structure is generally an
+ * encrypted certificate bag and it's generally encrypted with 40-bit
+ * RC2-CBC. */
+ CBS version_bytes, eci, contents_type, ai, encrypted_contents;
+ X509_ALGOR *algor = NULL;
+ const uint8_t *inp;
+ uint8_t *out;
+ size_t out_len;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &contents, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &version_bytes, CBS_ASN1_INTEGER) ||
+ /* EncryptedContentInfo, see
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-10.1 */
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&contents, &eci, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &contents_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ /* AlgorithmIdentifier, see
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 */
+ !CBS_get_asn1_element(&eci, &ai, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&eci, &encrypted_contents,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&contents_type) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ inp = CBS_data(&ai);
+ algor = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&ai));
+ if (algor == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inp != CBS_data(&ai) + CBS_len(&ai)) {
+ X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!pbe_crypt(algor, ctx->password, ctx->password_len,
+ CBS_data(&encrypted_contents), CBS_len(&encrypted_contents),
+ &out, &out_len, 0 /* decrypt */)) {
+ X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ X509_ALGOR_free(algor);
+
+ CBS_init(&content_infos, out, out_len);
+ ret = PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&content_infos, depth + 1, ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ } else if (nid == NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ CBS octet_string_contents;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &octet_string_contents,
+ CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&octet_string_contents, depth + 1, ctx);
+ } else if (nid == NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag) {
+ /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+ * 4.2.2. */
+ const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&wrapped_contents);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *pki = NULL;
+ X509_SIG *encrypted = NULL;
+
+ if (*ctx->out_key) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_MULTIPLE_PRIVATE_KEYS_IN_PKCS12);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* encrypted isn't actually an X.509 signature, but it has the same
+ * structure as one and so |X509_SIG| is reused to store it. */
+ encrypted = d2i_X509_SIG(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&wrapped_contents));
+ if (encrypted == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inp != CBS_data(&wrapped_contents) + CBS_len(&wrapped_contents)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ pki = PKCS8_decrypt_pbe(encrypted, ctx->password, ctx->password_len);
+ X509_SIG_free(encrypted);
+ if (pki == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ *ctx->out_key = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(pki);
+ PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(pki);
+
+ if (ctx->out_key == NULL) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ } else if (nid == NID_certBag) {
+ CBS cert_bag, cert_type, wrapped_cert, cert;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_contents, &cert_bag, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &cert_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&cert_bag, &wrapped_cert,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_cert, &cert, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&cert_type) == NID_x509Certificate) {
+ const uint8_t *inp = CBS_data(&cert);
+ X509 *x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &inp, CBS_len(&cert));
+ if (!x509) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (inp != CBS_data(&cert) + CBS_len(&cert)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_handle_content_info,
+ PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (0 == sk_X509_push(ctx->out_certs, x509)) {
+ X509_free(x509);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Unknown element type - ignore it. */
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(EVP_PKEY **out_key, STACK_OF(X509) *out_certs,
+ CBS *ber_in, const char *password) {
+ uint8_t *der_bytes = NULL;
+ size_t der_len;
+ CBS in, pfx, mac_data, authsafe, content_type, wrapped_authsafes, authsafes;
+ uint64_t version;
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct pkcs12_context ctx;
+ const size_t original_out_certs_len = sk_X509_num(out_certs);
+
+ /* The input may be in BER format. */
+ if (!CBS_asn1_ber_to_der(ber_in, &der_bytes, &der_len)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (der_bytes != NULL) {
+ CBS_init(&in, der_bytes, der_len);
+ } else {
+ CBS_init(&in, CBS_data(ber_in), CBS_len(ber_in));
+ }
+
+ *out_key = NULL;
+ memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+
+ /* See ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-12/pkcs-12v1.pdf, section
+ * four. */
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&in, &pfx, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ CBS_len(&in) != 0 ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&pfx, &version)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (version < 3) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_VERSION);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &authsafe, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (CBS_len(&pfx) == 0) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_MISSING_MAC);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&pfx, &mac_data, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* authsafe is a PKCS#7 ContentInfo. See
+ * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2315#section-7. */
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &content_type, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&authsafe, &wrapped_authsafes,
+ CBS_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC | CBS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 0)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The content type can either be |NID_pkcs7_data| or |NID_pkcs7_signed|. The
+ * latter indicates that it's signed by a public key, which isn't
+ * supported. */
+ if (OBJ_cbs2nid(&content_type) != NID_pkcs7_data) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse,
+ PKCS8_R_PKCS12_PUBLIC_KEY_INTEGRITY_NOT_SUPPORTED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&wrapped_authsafes, &authsafes, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx.out_key = out_key;
+ ctx.out_certs = out_certs;
+ if (!ascii_to_ucs2(password, strlen(password), &ctx.password,
+ &ctx.password_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_DECODE_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify the MAC. */
+ {
+ CBS mac, hash_type_seq, hash_oid, salt, expected_mac;
+ uint64_t iterations;
+ int hash_nid;
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ uint8_t hmac_key[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ uint8_t hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned hmac_len;
+
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &mac, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &hash_type_seq, CBS_ASN1_SEQUENCE) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&hash_type_seq, &hash_oid, CBS_ASN1_OBJECT) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&mac, &expected_mac, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING) ||
+ !CBS_get_asn1(&mac_data, &salt, CBS_ASN1_OCTETSTRING)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* The iteration count is optional and the default is one. */
+ iterations = 1;
+ if (CBS_len(&mac_data) > 0) {
+ if (!CBS_get_asn1_uint64(&mac_data, &iterations) ||
+ iterations > INT_MAX) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_BAD_PKCS12_DATA);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ hash_nid = OBJ_cbs2nid(&hash_oid);
+ if (hash_nid == NID_undef ||
+ (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(hash_nid)) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_UNKNOWN_HASH);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!pkcs12_key_gen_raw(ctx.password, ctx.password_len, CBS_data(&salt),
+ CBS_len(&salt), PKCS12_MAC_ID, iterations,
+ EVP_MD_size(md), hmac_key, md)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (NULL == HMAC(md, hmac_key, EVP_MD_size(md), CBS_data(&authsafes),
+ CBS_len(&authsafes), hmac, &hmac_len)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!CBS_mem_equal(&expected_mac, hmac, hmac_len)) {
+ OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(PKCS8, PKCS12_parse, PKCS8_R_INCORRECT_PASSWORD);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* authsafes contains a series of PKCS#7 ContentInfos. */
+ if (!PKCS12_handle_content_infos(&authsafes, 0, &ctx)) {
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+err:
+ if (ctx.password) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ctx.password);
+ }
+ if (der_bytes) {
+ OPENSSL_free(der_bytes);
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (*out_key) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(*out_key);
+ *out_key = NULL;
+ }
+ while (sk_X509_num(out_certs) > original_out_certs_len) {
+ X509 *x509 = sk_X509_pop(out_certs);
+ X509_free(x509);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_PBE_add(){};
+
+struct pkcs12_st {
+ uint8_t *ber_bytes;
+ size_t ber_len;
+};
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12(PKCS12 **out_p12, const uint8_t **ber_bytes, size_t ber_len) {
+ PKCS12 *p12;
+
+ /* out_p12 must be NULL because we don't export the PKCS12 structure. */
+ assert(out_p12 == NULL);
+
+ p12 = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(PKCS12));
+ if (!p12) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ p12->ber_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(ber_len);
+ if (!p12->ber_bytes) {
+ OPENSSL_free(p12);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(p12->ber_bytes, *ber_bytes, ber_len);
+ p12->ber_len = ber_len;
+ *ber_bytes += ber_len;
+
+ return p12;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_bio(BIO *bio, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+ size_t used = 0;
+ BUF_MEM *buf;
+ const uint8_t *dummy;
+ static const size_t kMaxSize = 256 * 1024;
+ PKCS12 *ret = NULL;
+
+ buf = BUF_MEM_new();
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (BUF_MEM_grow(buf, 8192) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ int n = BIO_read(bio, &buf->data[used], buf->length - used);
+ if (n < 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (n == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+ used += n;
+
+ if (used < buf->length) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (buf->length > kMaxSize ||
+ BUF_MEM_grow(buf, buf->length * 2) == 0) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ dummy = (uint8_t*) buf->data;
+ ret = d2i_PKCS12(out_p12, &dummy, used);
+
+out:
+ BUF_MEM_free(buf);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+PKCS12* d2i_PKCS12_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS12 **out_p12) {
+ BIO *bio;
+ PKCS12 *ret;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_fp(fp, 0 /* don't take ownership */);
+ if (!bio) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret = d2i_PKCS12_bio(bio, out_p12);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int PKCS12_parse(const PKCS12 *p12, const char *password, EVP_PKEY **out_pkey,
+ X509 **out_cert, STACK_OF(X509) **out_ca_certs) {
+ CBS ber_bytes;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *ca_certs = NULL;
+ char ca_certs_alloced = 0;
+
+ if (out_ca_certs != NULL && *out_ca_certs != NULL) {
+ ca_certs = *out_ca_certs;
+ }
+
+ if (!ca_certs) {
+ ca_certs = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (ca_certs == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ca_certs_alloced = 1;
+ }
+
+ CBS_init(&ber_bytes, p12->ber_bytes, p12->ber_len);
+ if (!PKCS12_get_key_and_certs(out_pkey, ca_certs, &ber_bytes, password)) {
+ if (ca_certs_alloced) {
+ sk_X509_free(ca_certs);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ *out_cert = NULL;
+ if (sk_X509_num(ca_certs) > 0) {
+ *out_cert = sk_X509_shift(ca_certs);
+ }
+
+ if (out_ca_certs) {
+ *out_ca_certs = ca_certs;
+ } else {
+ sk_X509_pop_free(ca_certs, X509_free);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+void PKCS12_free(PKCS12 *p12) {
+ OPENSSL_free(p12->ber_bytes);
+ OPENSSL_free(p12);
+}