diff options
| author | David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org> | 2014-08-30 21:56:06 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Langley <agl@google.com> | 2014-09-02 22:42:26 +0000 |
| commit | f0fd37323bfb173d88a782653259f4766d4f09ba (patch) | |
| tree | 1c17666996cf84e0c9e96c1500c61fd749c97578 | |
| parent | 8a5825e4c7238eef74f8a7ad5b054914e16899cb (diff) | |
| download | src-f0fd37323bfb173d88a782653259f4766d4f09ba.tar.gz | |
Remove remnants of EVP_CIPHER-based AES_GCM cipher.
Those codepaths are never hit.
Change-Id: Ib6908ebe90ab667774785298fdc3f96acc4b50df
Reviewed-on: https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/1693
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_cbc.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_pkt.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/ssl_ciph.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_enc.c | 18 |
4 files changed, 3 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index e80734e..4af096d 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -181,13 +181,6 @@ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL* s, } } - if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(s->enc_read_ctx->cipher)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) - { - /* padding is already verified */ - rec->length -= padding_length + 1; - return 1; - } - good = constant_time_ge(rec->length, overhead+padding_length); /* The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c index 12c5467..864e48d 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c +++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c @@ -760,9 +760,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, if (eivlen <= 1) eivlen = 0; } - /* Need explicit part of IV for GCM mode */ - else if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - eivlen = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; else eivlen = 0; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 691b5fd..8361007 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -354,8 +354,7 @@ int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, if (!ssl_cipher_get_mac(s, md, mac_pkey_type, mac_secret_size)) return 0; - if ((*enc != NULL) && - (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc)&EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) && + if ((*enc != NULL) && (*md != NULL) && (!mac_pkey_type||*mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { if (s->ssl_version>>8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index a2d96d6..abe5183 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -521,11 +521,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) else { key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(cipher); - - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; - else - iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); + iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher); } key_data = s->s3->tmp.key_block; @@ -617,11 +613,7 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->session,&c,&hash,&mac_type,&mac_secret_size)) goto cipher_unavailable_err; key_len = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); - - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) - iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; - else - iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); + iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); } s->s3->tmp.new_aead=aead; @@ -951,12 +943,6 @@ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) ?(i<0) :(i==0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) - { - rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; - } #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG { |